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Two studies examined the use of Think Aloud (TA) protocol as a means for collecting
data of cognitive processes during performance in golf. In Study 1, TA was employed
to examine if different verbalisation (Level 2 or Level 3 TA) instructions influence
performance of high and low skilled golfers. Participants performed 30 putts using TA at
either Levels 2, 3, or no verbalization condition. Although Level 3 verbalization produced
a higher volume of verbal data than Level 2, TA at either Level 2 or 3 did not impair
putting performance compared to no verbalization. Study 2 examined the congruence
between data collected via TA at Level 3 and cued retrospective recall of cognitive
processes during golf performance. Experienced golfers performed six holes of golf
whilst engaging in Level 3 TA. After performance, three semi-structured retrospective
interviews were conducted (10 min after performance, 24 h after performance and
48 h after performance). A comparison of the themes identified large discrepancies
between the information reported during TA and at interview, with only 38–41% similarity
in variables reported to influence decision making on each hole. Both studies suggest
TA is a valuable method for recording cognitive processes of individuals during task
performance. TA provides richer verbal data regarding decisions than cued retrospective
recall, and TA does not negatively impact performance.
Keywords: Think Aloud, verbal protocol, motor task, golf, cognitive processes, retrospective recall,
verbalizations, methodology in psychological research
Introduction
Within the sport psychology literature there is a growing interest in athlete cognitions and
how these cognitions underpin behavior (Eccles, 2012). As a result it is important to carefully
consider methodologies which are appropriate for collecting this type of data. Ericsson and
Simon (1993) introduced the ‘Think Aloud (TA)’ method, which involved asking participants to
continuously ‘ TA’ and report their thoughts during the performance of a task. Ericsson and Simon
(1993) emphasized the importance of TA in comparison to other methods, such as retrospective
recall, due to vital information that may be lost when retrospective reports are used. TA has
been used frequently in research to investigate decision making in chess (Gobet and Charness,
2006), medicine (Ericsson, 2004, 2007), nursing (Aitken and Mardegan, 2000), Scrabble (Tuﬃash
et al., 2007), and algebra tasks (Cook, 2006). However, there is very little research that has
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used TA for collecting cognitive processes and decision making
in sports tasks.
Three types of verbal report protocols have been identiﬁed
(Ericsson and Simon, 1993). Level 1 verbalization is simply the
vocalization of inner speech where the individual does not need
to make any eﬀort to communicate his or her thoughts. Level
2 verbalization involves the verbal encoding and vocalization of
an internal representation that is not originally in verbal code.
For example, verbal encoding and vocalization of scents, visual
stimuli, or movement. With this level of verbalization, only the
information that is in the participants focus is to be verbalized.
Level 3 verbalization requires the individual to explain his or
her thoughts, ideas, hypotheses, or motives (Ericsson and Simon,
1993), for example explaining why a certain shot or club is
selected in golf.
Within the current sport literature TA has been used to
collect data around appraisals and coping in trap shooting
(Calmeiro et al., 2010) and golf (Nicholls and Polman, 2008),
gender diﬀerences in stress, appraisal, and coping in golf
putting (Kaiseler et al., 2012) and expert novice diﬀerences
planning strategies in tennis, (McPherson, 2000; McPherson
and Kernodle, 2007). More recently, Calmeiro and Tenenbaum
(2011) used TA at Level 2 to investigate diﬀerences in
the cognitions of experienced and novice golfers during a
putting task. Through the use of TA the authors were able
to conclude ﬁndings such as experienced golfers spent more
time than beginners assessing the conditions and planning
and experienced players verbalized more diagnostic-related
thoughts after the putt and followed these thoughts with
planning the next putt. Novice golfers focussed more on
the technical aspect of the putt. Whilst this study provides
an important insight into skill level diﬀerences in cognitive
processes of golfers, the very small sample size (3 per
condition) limits the generalizability of ﬁndings. Calmeiro and
Tenenbaum (2011) therefore provided a recommendation that
further research needs to identify whether TA interferes with
performance.
It has been argued that instructing participants to TA may
interfere with thought processes and negatively impact on
task performance (Klatzky, 1984), particularly TA at Level 3
(Ericsson and Simon, 1993). A recent meta-analysis by Fox et al.
(2011) compared performance on tasks that involved concurrent
verbal reporting conditions with their matching silent control
conditions. They found that instructing participants to verbalize
their thoughts during a task did not alter performance, whereas
directing participants to provide explanations for their thoughts
actually improved performance. In the meta-analysis by Fox et al.
(2011) the majority of tasks were cognitive in nature. To our
knowledge no previous studies have examined the inﬂuence of
TA protocol on motor performance. If TA is to be used more
widely to examine cognition in sports it is important to establish
if the TAmethodology interferes with performance on sport tasks
(Calmeiro and Tenenbaum, 2011).
It is also important to consider factors which might potentially
moderate the use of TA on motor performance. One such factor
is the skill level of the participants. Masters (1992) proposed
the theory of reinvestment which suggests that the automisation
of a task can be undone or disrupted if a performer tries to
control a task or action consciously with declarative knowledge.
Fitts and Posner’s (1967) framework of skill learning is part
of the reinvestment theory framework. Learning progresses
from the declarative, cognitive stage where the performance is
cognitively controlled in a step-by-step manner, when learning
progresses performance becomesmore procedural and automatic
which requires little cognitive attention. In the early stages
of learning there are rules which the performer cognitively
attends to whereas later in the learning process this becomes
automatic and the cognitive load changes. Masters (1992)
proposed the progression regression hypothesis or reinvestment
where high level performance can regress to early stages of
skill development in which the execution are more reliant on
verbal cues and explicit declarative knowledge (Fitts and Posner,
1967; Anderson, 1982). According to Masters (1992) during
progression- regression, a disruption in performance occurs
when an ‘integrated’ real time control structure that can run
as an uninterrupted (for example, a professional golfers driving
oﬀ the tee) unit is broken down back into smaller, separate
independent units, similar to how it was originally attended to
in a step-by-step fashion during the early stages of learning.
This in turn slows down performance as each component is
run separately instead of all together; as a result there is a
gap in each unit which creates more room for error, which
would not be present in the integrated autonomous structure
(Masters, 1992; Beilock and Carr, 2001). Therefore, it could be
argued that by asking a performer who is in the later stages
of skill development to verbalize their thought process during
performance of amotor skill could result in their skill breakdown.
In comparison, Beilock et al. (2002) found that novice or less
proﬁcient performers beneﬁtted from attentional monitoring of
step-by-step performance.
As a result of the potential limitations previously mentioned
to date the majority of research has opted to use retrospective
methods to gain insights into thoughts and actions that occur
during sport performance. For example, Macquet (2009) studied
expert volleyball players and their decision making process using
self-confrontational interviews, which were conducted between
the 2nd and 5th day following a volleyball match. In addition,
Mulligan et al. (2012) used retrospective interviews, prompted by
video recordings, to investigate the decision quality in ice-hockey.
However, cued retrospective recall of events has a number of
important limitations. One issue that has been shown to aﬀect
reporting accuracy is memory decay (Ericsson and Simon, 1980;
Nicholls and Polman, 2008). In addition, retrospective reports are
also distorted by knowledge about success of eﬀorts to resolve
stressful events (Brown and Harris, 1978). This can also be linked
to the issue of bias as Bahrick et al. (1996) found that recall of
student’s high school grades was inﬂuenced by the attractiveness
of the grade received. Researchers found that the grade A was
recalled accurately 89% of the time but the grade D was only
recalled 29% of the time.
Tenenbaum and Elran (2003) examined the congruence
between actual and retrospective reports for pre- and post-
competition emotional states; that were collected 1 h before
the event, 30 min after the event and 72 h after the event
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using a questionnaire. The results revealed that retrospective
reports were not aﬀected by the pre–post interference after a
72 h delay. However, athletes underestimated the intensity of
post competition unpleasant emotions. In addition, thoughts
and feelings that were openly expressed after 72 h were not
fully congruent with thoughts and feelings reported in real time.
Tenenbaum et al. (2002) also highlighted concerns of whether
retrospective reports signify the athlete’s schematic knowledge
of how they generally feel before and after a competition.
Retrospective measures might be tapping ‘a general schema’ or
overlearned set of emotions rather than the particular emotions
experienced before an event. Eccles (2012) argues that during
retrospective reports participants might be aware of general
strategies and recall and report strategies directly and without
preference to speciﬁc behavior they produced.
The aims of the current studies were mainly methodological in
nature. Based on the previous critiques that TA has encountered
around interference with performance we ﬁrst wanted to
establish the utility of the TAmethodology in the domain of sport
in general and golf in particular by examining whether the use of
TA at Level 2 or 3 inﬂuenced motor performance (golf putting)
and the potential moderating eﬀects of skill level. We therefore
examined how diﬀerent levels of TA inﬂuence actual performance
and information provided by diﬀerent skill level performers.
Hence, based on reinvestment theory diﬀerences in performance
and verbalisations based on skill level could be expected when
using TA in sport.
Secondly, we examined the congruence between TA and the
more commonly used retrospective recall methodology.
Study 1
The ﬁrst study’s primary aim was to examine whether TA
inﬂuences motor performance and the potential mediating eﬀects
of skill level. Thinking aloud involves continuous reporting of
conscious thoughts during the performance of a task. Engaging
in TA may promote a self-focus of attention as a performer
verbalizes their thoughts and decisions. Masters (1992) suggests
that the automatisation of a task can be undone or disrupted
if a performer tries to consciously attend to a task. In terms of
a motor skill, it can be argued that the level of skill that the
performer possesses could also relate to the eﬀect that thinking
aloud has on performance. Hence, for skilled performers, which
are assumed to be in the automatic phase of skill learning (Fitts
and Posner, 1967), it could be suggested that focussing attention
on the skill itself degrades performance (Schmidt, 1982) and
reinvestment could occur (Masters et al., 1993). It has been
proposed that performers in the automatic phase of skill learning
will execute the skill in an open-loop fashion where there is little
conscious control and processing required. Whereas a novice
will be in the closed loop, feedback driven mode, and attention
demanding processing (Schmidt andWrisberg, 2000). Therefore,
more experienced golfers may experience more disruption in
performance if they engage in TA in comparison to novices
due to TA causing the more experienced golfer to attend to
their performance in a more step-by-step fashion. However,
Fox et al. (2011) found that asking participants to verbalize
the task did not impair performance, and when elaborating on
the task improvements were found. Study 1 aims to investigate
if the use of TA impacts motor performance, by comparing
experienced and novice golfers putting performance when using
either Level 2 TA, Level 3 TA, or no verbalization. As literature
suggests Level 2 verbalization does not have a negative eﬀect on
performance (Ericsson and Simon, 1993; Fox et al., 2011), but
Level 3 verbalization may aﬀect performance it was predicted
that (a) participants in the Level 2 verbalization condition
would perform as well as participants in the control condition
and (b) that skilled participants in the Level 3 verbalization
condition would perform worse than both the control and
Level 2 verbalization conditions and novice participants would
perform better in the Level 3 verbalization condition than in
both the control and Level 2 verbalization conditions. Finally,
the content of the verbalizations was analyzed to ensure the TA
was carried out according to instructions. Hence, we expected
that Level 3 verbalization would result in qualitatively diﬀerent
information as well as quantitatively more information. In
addition, the qualitative analysis of the TA data was conducted
to provide evidence of possible moderating eﬀects of skill level on
performance.
Methods
Participants
Skilled participants were thirty male golfers (age:M = 16.9 years,
s = 0.82; handicap: M = 5.3, s = 1.51) who attended a further
education college in the North of England. Skilled golfers played
a minimum of once per week and an average of 8.5 years playing
experience. Novice participants were 18 males and 12 females
(age: M = 21.8 years, s = 1.42) who were university students.
Novice participants reported they did not play golf on a regular
basis and none had played golf in the month prior to testing.
Institutional ethical approval was secured and informed consent
was obtained from all participants.
Apparatus
Novice golfers all used the same right-handed putter, whereas
skilled golfers used their own putters. The putting surface was an
AstroTurf artiﬁcial indoor putting green. The putting hole was a
standard size (0.108 m diameter). Thirty of the same brand golf
balls were used throughout the testing. A digital voice recorder
was used with a small microphone attached to the participant’s
collar, and a wire placed inside the shirt connecting to the
recording device which was put in the trouser pocket.
Procedures
Prior to conducting the experimental procedure all participants
took part in a pre-test of putting 10 balls from a 2.50 m distance,
which acted to match the participants in the diﬀerent conditions
on ability; by placing an equal ability range of participants into
the three conditions (Level 2 verbalization, Level 3 verbalization,
no verbalization control) based on the result out of 10 putts.
Participants then performed a further 30 putts from a distance
of 3 m on an indoor putting green. Instructions for the two TA
protocols were adapted to golf putting based upon the guidelines
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set out by Ericsson and Simon (1993) and Nicholls and Polman
(2008). Participants in the Level 2 verbalization group were
instructed to say out loud what they were thinking at all times
before and after the execution of the putt. Participants in the
Level 3 condition were given the same instructions, however,
they were also asked to describe and explain their thoughts,
providing explanations for their actions. Participants in both
conditions were instructed to TA throughout the 30 putts apart
from when they were executing the putt. It is important to
note that participants were not instructed to verbalize during
putt execution to reduce any sort of interference with motor
movement (Schmidt and Wrisberg, 2000). If participants were
silent for a period of longer than 10 s they would be asked to
resume thinking aloud. The third group consisted of a control
group and performed 30 putts from the same distance as the other
two groups but without any TA instructions. All participants’
scores were recorded, and scores were based on how many putts
holed out of 30 putts.
Before the start of the trial, all participants took part in a
series of TA exercises to ensure that they could engage in the
TA protocol adequately at the level that they were assigned to
(Ericsson and Simon, 1993). Both the Levels 2 and 3 verbalization
groups completed three tasks: (1) counting the number of dots on
a page, (2) an arithmetic exercise, and (3) an anagram problem-
solving task. Participants in the Level 2 condition were asked to
complete the tasks aloud without explaining how they did them
whereas Level 3 participants were asked to also explain how they
completed the exercise. Participants took part in these exercises
until they had grasped the TA process; which took no longer
than 30 min. This exercise took part in meeting room in a close
proximity to the putting green.
Analysis
Performance outcome
A 2 (skill) × 3 (condition) analysis of variance was conducted to
explore if there were diﬀerences in pre-test putting performance
(number of putts holed) between the three groups. To analyze
performance on the main putting task the number of putts holed
out of 30 was calculated for each participant and a 2 (skill) × 3
(condition) analysis of variance was conducted.
Data analysis of content
In order to examine whether Levels 2 and 3 verbalization
resulted in qualitatively and quantitatively diﬀerent information
and whether skill level moderated this eﬀect we transcribed
verbalizations verbatim. Following checks for relevance and
consistency each transcript was subjected to a line by line content
analysis by the ﬁrst author to identify statements which related to
the cognitive process of each shot played. Individual elements of
‘meaningful information’ were considered and coded. Similar to
Nicholls and Polman (2008) the verbalizations by the participants
that were coded were relevant to the task, which in this case
meant verbalizations associated with golf performance. Data
which were not relevant to the task, such as verbalizations about
what an individual had eaten last night, a loved one, and their
favorite football team, were removed from the data set. Units of
information were coded according to categories derived from a
modiﬁed version of Calmeiro and Tenenbaum’s (2011) coding
scheme (see Table 1). This coding scheme was used and adapted
as it was one of the only studies to have examined cognition
processes using TA in golf putting previous to this paper. The
second author independently analyzed a 10% sample of verbal
data; the inter-rater agreement was 89%.
A 2 (skill) × 2 (condition) ANOVA was conducted to explore
the diﬀerence in the amount of data (words) produced during
Levels 2 and 3 verbalization and the two ability levels. Based on
the an adaptation of Calmeiro and Tenenbaum (2011) coding
scheme the units of information that were coded were analyzed
using a 2 (skill) × 2 (condition) MANOVA to investigate the
diﬀerence in the total frequency of themes that were verbalized
during Levels 2 and 3 verbalization for both experienced and
novice golfers. Signiﬁcant multivariate eﬀects were followed up
with univariate ANOVA and independent t-tests with Bonferroni
correction.
Results
Performance
The ﬁrst 2 (skill) × 3 (condition) ANOVA examined pre-test
performance (number of successful puts out of 10 attempts).
As expected there was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect for skill
[F(1,54) = 10.73, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.17] with skilled players
(M = 4.83,SD = 2.23) outperforming novice players (M = 3.03,
SD = 1.87), however, there was no signiﬁcant main eﬀect for
condition [F(2,54) = 0.05, p = 0.953, η2p = 0.002] or interaction
between skill and condition [F(2,54) = 0.01, p = 0.989,
η2p< 0.001]. This ﬁnding implies that pre-test performance across
conditions was equivalent.
The second 2 (skill) × 3 (condition) ANOVA analyzed test
performance (number of successful putts out of 30 attempts). For
descriptive statistics see Table 2. A signiﬁcant main eﬀect was
found for skill [F(1,54) = 20.76, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.28]. Skilled
golfers performed better (M = 10.97, SD = 4.82) than novice
golfers (M = 5.87, SD = 3.96). No signiﬁcant main eﬀect was
found for condition [F(2,54) = 2.79, p = 0.08, η2p = 0.09] and
TABLE 1 | Coding scheme framework adapted from Calmeiro and Tenenbaum (2011).
Theme Description Example of raw data quote
Gathering information Reflected participants’ search for relevant characteristics of the environment “There’s a break left,” “there’s a ridge on the middle of the green”
Planning Reference to planning a shot, for example targets to aim for, power of putt. “Need to aim more right,” “I need to be a bit more firm”
Technical instruction Specified technical aspects of the performance “Arms bent,” “feet are parallel”
Reflection Reflected on what had happened in terms of process or evaluation of the putt “Just missed left,” “it broke at the end,” “yes, good putt”
Self-encouragement Refers to any positive words relating to self-encouragement. “You can do this,” “concentrate on this”
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 July 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1083
Whitehead et al. Examining Think Aloud protocol analysis
TABLE 2 | Mean and (SD) test performance (successful putts out of 30) as
a function of skill and condition.
Skill Control Level 2 Level 3
Skilled 9.40 (3.24) 12.30 (4.97) 11.20 (5.92)
Novice 3.70 (3.65) 6.60 (3.89) 7.30 (3.74)
Total 6.55 (4.45) 9.45 (5.24) 9.25 (5.22)
there was no signiﬁcant interaction between skill and condition
[F(2,54)= 0.28, p= 0.75, η2p = 0.01].
Verbalization Content
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the volume of verbal
data provided (number of words) during test performance for
the skilled and novice golfers in the Levels 2 and 3 verbalization
conditions. A 2 (skill) by 2 (condition) ANOVA showed a
signiﬁcant condition main eﬀect [F(1,36) = 66.31, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.64]. Level 3 verbal protocol resulted in signiﬁcantly more
words verbalized (M = 385, SD = 110) compared to Level 2
verbal protocol (M = 141, SD = 69). There was no signiﬁcant
main eﬀect for skill [F(1,36) = 0.01, p = 0.89, η2p < 0.001] nor
was there a signiﬁcant interaction [F(1,36) = 0.03; p = 0.85,
η2p = 0.001].
Once verbal data was thematically analyzed, the frequency of
verbalization of each theme was compared with a 2 (skill) × 2
(condition) MANOVA. Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for
the frequency of verbalization of each data theme for the skilled
and novice golfers in the Levels 2 and 3 verbalization conditions.
There was a signiﬁcant multivariate interaction between skill
and condition [Wilks’ λ = 0.46, F(5,32) = 5.15, p = 0.001,
η2p = 0.46], with univariate ANOVA’s indicating an interaction
only for the theme Technical Instruction [F(1,36) = 17.68,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.33]. Independent t-tests with Bonferroni
correction indicated novice golfers verbalized more about
technical instructions than skilled golfers in the Level 3 condition
TABLE 3 | Mean and (SD) volume of verbal data provided (number of
words) during test performance as a function of skill and condition.
Skill Level 2 Level 3
Skilled 136.70 (73.99) 385.30 (122.58)
Novice 145.90 (67.05) 383.80 (103.42)
Total 141.30 (68.88) 384.55 (110.38)
TABLE 4 | Mean and (SD) frequency of verbalization of each data theme
during test performance as a function of skill and condition.
Measure Level 2 Level 3
Skilled Novice Skilled Novice
Gathering information 1.00 (1.33) 0.00 (0.00) 3.00 (2.00) 0.70 (1.64)
Self-encouragement 2.30 (2.36) 4.40 (3.81) 3.10 (3.03) 2.40 (1.86)
Planning 10.30 (7.46) 7.00 (4.00) 15.30 (3.43) 11.00 (6.56)
Reflection 10.20 (3.73) 15.40 (7.47) 16.10 (6.34) 16.80 (5.12)
Technical instruction 4.40 (4.79) 1.60 (1.89) 2.80 (2.89) 8.90 (3.14)
[t(18) = 4.51, p < 0.001], but not in the Level 2 condition
[t(18) = 1.72, p= 0.103].
There was a signiﬁcant multivariate eﬀect for skill [Wilks’
λ= 0.65, F(5,32)= 3.41, p= 0.014, η2p= 0.35] with skilled golfers
verbalizing more frequently than novice golfers about gathering
information [F(1,36)= 12.24, p= 0.001, η2p= 0.25] and planning
shots [F(1,36)= 4.56, p= 0.04, η2p = 0.11].
There was a signiﬁcant multivariate eﬀect for condition
[Wilks’ λ = 0.40, F(5,32) = 9.56, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.60], with
more verbalization in the Level 3 than Level 2 condition about
gathering information [F(1,36) = 8.19, p = 0.007, η2p = 0.19],
planning shots [F(1,36) = 6.39, p = 0.016, η2p = 0.15], and
technical instruction [F(1,36) = 2.43, p= 0.011, η2p = 0.17].
Discussion
The results of Study 1 showed contrary to predictions that
the use of verbalization at either Level 2 or Level 3 did
not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence performance across skill level. This
indicates that Level 3 TA verbalization, requiring explanations
of a performers thought processes, is not associated with
decreases in motor performance in comparison to Level 2 TA
verbalization or no-verbalization irrespective of the skill level
of the performer. Examination of mean performance actually
suggested performance was slightly better in the TA conditions
than control. From a theoretical perspective, reinvestment theory
(Masters, 1992) suggests that, TA has the potential to negatively
inﬂuence performance among skilled performers. By instructing
golfers to TA their attention could be directed to the step-by-
step mechanics of the skill which has been associated with poorer
performance. In the present study there was no clear evidence
that thinking aloud resulted in skilled performers reinvesting
in explicit rules. Skilled performers verbalized few technical
instructions in either the Level 2 or Level 3 TA conditions,
with the majority of verbalizations focused on planning and
evaluating shots. This ﬁnding suggests TA does not result in
reinvestment and does not lead to performance breakdown.
However, a possible explanation for the converse performance
eﬀect found in the higher skilled group is that the golfers did
not dwell on mistakes or technical errors (reminisce/ruminate)
but that TA helps them to actively seek solutions as indexed by
greater use of deliberate planning and gathering information.
Because of their greater knowledge base, skilled golfers are more
likely to use the information and planning to their advantage
and enhance their performance (see Gagné and Smith, 1962 for
similar results). The absence of reporting of increased technical
information during TA at Level 3 in the skilled group might also
explain the lack of performance decrements in this group. Hence,
reinvestment theory suggests that it is particularly the monitoring
or the actual execution of the motor skill which might result in
skill breakdown and performance decrements (Masters, 1992).
Further analysis of the content of the data revealed that Level
3 verbalization produced a larger amount of verbal data than
Level 2 independent of skill level. In addition, diﬀerences were
apparent between Levels 2 and 3 TA and between skilled and
novice participants. This suggests that Levels 2 and 3 TA results
in qualitatively and quantitatively diﬀerent information and skill
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level also inﬂuences the information provided. In particular,
skilled golfers verbalized more about gathering information and
planning before taking a putt than novices. Whereas novices
verbalized more about the technical aspects of their performance
compared to skilled golfers, but only when using TA at Level 3.
Similar results were reported by Calmeiro and Tenenbaum
(2011) where beginners focussed on mainly technical aspects
during TA and high level golfers reported greater use of gathering
information and planning. Similarly, Beilock et al. (2002) found
that experts made less reference to putting mechanics in their
episodic recollections than novices. Beilock et al. (2002) proposed
that a novice’s performance of a skill is based on declarative
knowledge that is held in working memory and is attended to
in a step-by-step fashion (Fitts and Posner, 1967; Anderson,
1983, 1987). Low level golfers are likely to be in the cognitive
phase of learning (Fitts and Posner, 1967) which is characterized
by using explicit, technical information to guide skill execution
whereas the high level golfers are more likely in the autonomous
phase of skill learning. This stage is characterized by the use of
implicit knowledge. Therefore, by examining the content on the
verbalisations clear diﬀerences have been identiﬁed between the
level of TA used and the expertise of the performer.
The results of Study 1 showed that, independent of skill
level, performance was slightly better in the TA conditions in
comparison to the control condition. A possible explanation
for this observation is that TA resulted in the participants
spending more time planning and evaluating their performance.
This in turn might have resulted in developing strategies which
enhanced performance. Future studies might examine additional
factors which might result in diﬀerence between TA and control,
including eye-movement or behavioral aspects.
To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst study which has
demonstrated that TA at Level 3 does not impede motor
performance (Calmeiro and Tenenbaum, 2011) and results in
qualitatively and quantitatively diﬀerent information than that
obtained by Level 2 TA. The information provided at Level
3 appears to be richer in detail and skill level moderates the
information obtained at both Levels 2 and 3 TA. However,
study one cannot establish whether TA is a more appropriate
methodology of collecting data on cognitive processes during
sporting performance compared to other methodologies like
retrospective recall. We therefore conducted a second study the
further examine the utility of TA methodology.
Study 2
Study 2 was designed to compare the TA method with the more
commonly used retrospective recall. A lot of decision making
and cognitive processing research has adopted a retrospective
method (Macquet, 2009; Cotterill et al., 2010; Mulligan et al.,
2012). However, if data can be collected during performance of
a task it is thought this will minimize the event-recall period and
increase the likelihood of collecting accurate data (Folkman and
Moskowitz, 2004). This study aimed to examine the congruence
between the verbal data generated by golfers when using TA
and that generated by retrospective interviews. Participants
performed six holes of golf whilst engaging in Level 3 TA. After
performance, three semi-structured retrospective interviews were
conducted, 10 min after performance, 24 h after performance,
and 48 h after performance. It was predicted that with increasing
time there would be less correspondence between verbal data
captured using TA and retrospective recall. No prediction was
made with regard to the volume of information provided.
Methods
Participants
Participants were six male golfers (M age 30.5 years, M handicap
5.5, M playing years 19), and all members of the same golf club.
The participants were recruited via a sign-up sheet in the club
house and all participants were volunteers. Institutional ethical
approval was secured and informed consent was obtained from
all participants.
Materials
Each golfer played with their own golf clubs on the same six holes
of the same golf course. As in Study 1, participant’s verbalizations
were recorded using a Sennheiser USA ENG G3 wireless digital
voice recorder. A score card was used to mark the number of
shots taken on each hole.
Procedure
Participants were asked to meet 1 h prior to golf performance in
order to be briefed and to take part in a series of TA exercises
(see Study 1). Each of the golfers then played six holes of golf
accompanied by a researcher. During all six holes, participants
were asked to describe their thoughts before and after the
execution of each shot and provide an explanation for their
actions (Level 3 TA). Golfers were told that they could engage
in TA between holes if they had any thoughts they wished to
verbalize. Participants were instructed to, “Think Aloud and say
everything that comes into your head before and after each shot
you take. Every time you TA can you please explain this thought.”
If they were silent for a period of longer than 20 s they were
asked to resume TA. The thoughts were recorded until the golfers
had completed all six holes. Each golfer played on the same golf
course with their own golf clubs, although the six holes played
were varied for each golfer.
Following the completion of the six holes each participant
was then asked to take part in three semi-structured interviews,
the ﬁrst being approximately 10 min after performance of the
six holes. The second interview was held 24 h and the third
48 h after performance. Each interview involved asking semi-
structured questions about the decision making that occurred
during two separate holes for each interview. The selection of
the holes for retrospective recall were conducted in a random
manner. It is believe that random selection provides a far better
way of doing this than selecting holes on a number of criteria of
which we do not know if they have an inﬂuence or not on what
is recalled. Although there is some suggestion that success might
be better remembered, currently there is little evidence that there
are diﬀerences in remembering events which are more or less
successful in sport. For consistency the same sets of questions
were asked to each participant, however, participants were free
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to answer in any way they wanted. Both undirected and directed
questions were used during interviews (Eccles, 2012). Questions
asked during these semi structured interviews were, “please can
you describe hole. . .,” “can you tell me what you were thinking
about during your ﬁrst shot?,” “What kind of shot did you play
and why?,” “what club did you use and why?,” “were there any
environmental factors that aﬀected your shot?” Each interview
was conducted at the same time of day and took approximately
20 min to complete. It is important to note that undirected
questions such as “can you tell me what you were thinking
during your ﬁrst shot?” were used to try and provide information
of higher validity because the question avoids constraining the
participant to interpret thoughts (Eccles, 2012).
Data Analysis
Each participant’s verbal reports from TA and interviews
were transcribed verbatim. Following checks for relevance and
consistency each transcript was subjected to a line by line content
analysis by the ﬁrst author to identify statements which related
to the decision making process of each shot played. Individual
elements of ‘meaningful information’ were considered and coded.
Similar to Nicholls and Polman (2008) the verbalizations by the
participants that were coded were relevant to the task, which in
this case meant verbalizations associated with golf performance.
Data which were not relevant to the task, such as verbalizations
about what a participant had eaten the previous night, a loved
one, and their favorite football team, were removed from the
data set. Units of information were coded according to categories
derived from a modiﬁed version of Nicholls and Polman’s (2008)
coding scheme (see Table 5). Thirty-four ﬁrst-order themes were
initially identiﬁed and then related themes were grouped into 11
second-order themes. Amore detailed coding schemewas used in
Study 2 with a large number of ﬁrst-order themes to represent the
wide range of variables considered by participants when making
decisions on a real golf course. The second author independently
analyzed a 10% sample of the raw data using the coding scheme
developed by the ﬁrst author. The Level of agreement between
the ﬁrst and second author was 71%. Any discrepancies were
discussed and an agreement was reached.
Number of themes
The number of ﬁrst-order themes each participant identiﬁed as
inﬂuencing their decision making on each hole was calculated for
the TA and interview data. A 2 (condition) × 3 (time) repeated
measure ANOVA was conducted to identify any diﬀerences
between the number of themes identiﬁed via TA and interview.
A signiﬁcant interaction was followed up by paired samples
t-tests to compare TA and interview at each time point. The alpha
level was set at p< 0.05.
To establish how the data collected at TA and interview
diﬀered, the most frequently cited second-order themes using
each method of data collection were identiﬁed. Frequency of
citation of each theme between TA and interview were calculated
for each interview time point. Multiple 2 (condition) × 3 (time)
repeated measures ANOVA’s were conducted to investigate how
the second-order themes identiﬁed at TA and interview diﬀered
at each time point (10 min post performance, 24 h post and 48 h).
Similarity of themes
Percentage similarity of ﬁrst-order themes identiﬁed on each
shot during TA and interview was calculated at each interview
time point. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was then
conducted to determine any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
percentage similarity between TA and interview across the three
interview time points.
Results
Number of Themes
Table 6 displays the mean number of ﬁrst-order themes that
golfers identiﬁed as inﬂuencing their decision making during two
holes of golf, with a comparison made between data collected
using TA and interview at the three interview time points. A 2
(condition)× 3 (time) repeated measures ANOVA indicated that
there was a signiﬁcant interaction between condition and time
[F(2,10) = 9.49, p= 0.005, η2 = 0.65]. Follow up paired samples
t-tests indicated that quantitatively the mean number of ﬁrst-
order themes identiﬁed during TA did not diﬀer from the number
identiﬁed during the interview 10 min after performance or 24 h
after performance (p> 0.05). However, signiﬁcantly more themes
were identiﬁed via TA than at interview 48 h after performance
[t(5) = 3.44; p= 0.018, d = 0.43].
Figure 1 shows the diﬀerence between TA and interview in
the numbers of times each second-order theme was identiﬁed
as a variable inﬂuencing a decision, with comparisons displayed
for interview 10 min post performance vs. TA (1a), 24 h post
performance interview vs. TA (1b), and 48 h post performance
interview vs. TA (1c). A 2 × 3 repeated measures ANOVA
was conducted for each of the 11 second-order themes to
investigate how the second-order themes identiﬁed at TA and
interview diﬀered at each time point. There was a condition
main eﬀect for the second-order theme Score [F(1,5) = 15.92;
p = 0.01, η2 = 0.76] in that more verbalizations were made
about the score during TA than interview. In addition there
was a condition main eﬀect for the second-order theme Pre-
performance [F(1,5) = 39.71, p = < 0.001, η2 = 0.88], with
more verbalisations made about Pre-performance activity during
TA than during interview. Finally, there was a signiﬁcant
interaction between time and condition for the variable pre-
performance [F(2,10) = 6.31, p = 0.02, η2 = 0.56]. Follow up
paired samples t-tests found that pre-performance activity was
cited more frequently in TA reports than at interview 10 min
after performance [t(5) = 9.71, p < 0.001, d = 1.60], 24 h
after performance [t(5) = 3.00, p = 0.030, d = 1.61] and
48 h after performance [t(5) = 5.89, p = 0.002, d = 3.55].
The largest diﬀerence was between TA and the interview
48 h after performance as indicated by the larger eﬀect size.
All other main eﬀects and interactions were non-signiﬁcant
(p> 0.05).
Similarity of Themes
Table 7 shows the percentage similarity between TA and
interview for the thoughts (ﬁrst-order themes) verbalized by
golfers during decision making on each shot played. Percentage
similarity at each time point was relatively low (ranging between
38 and 41%), suggesting participants reported diﬀerent thoughts
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 July 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1083
Whitehead et al. Examining Think Aloud protocol analysis
TABLE 5 | First and second-order themes identified from Think Aloud (TA) and interview data.
Second-order theme First-order theme Description Example of ‘raw’ data quote
Course conditions Quality of greens Mention of grass length, or obstacles on the green
which could affect the run of the ball
“The green has been sanded so it’s bobbly”
Course hazards Anything stopping the player’s view the green or
anything which could disturb play
“Can’t see the hole because of the huge mound in front
of me”
Rough Being in the rough “I finished on the left side of the rough”
Course management Lie of ball When the golfer refers to the lie of the ball “the lie is not the best”
Playing bunker shot Being in the bunker “It’s in the bunker that’s horrendous”
Club selection Any reference to which club has been selected “I’m using a driver because. . .”
Pin position Where the pin is located on the green “It’s a blue flag which indicates the pin is at the back
portion of the green”
Movement of Green How the ball will move on the green “It’s going to move left to right”
Distance to pin
Tee position
How far the shot being played is from the pin
Where the tee is positioned on the green
“This is a 350 yard drive to the green”
“the tee is toward the back of the green”
Distractions Having to wait at tees Waiting to play a shot due to either slow play or green
keepers
“I could do with that old fella hurrying up”
Researcher Referring to the researcher “I feel an idiot doing this in front of you”
Dirt on the ball Having any form of mud or dirt on the ball “The ball was dirty”
Temperature Any reference to how hot or cold the player is “I’m really hot under this hat”
Environment Wind Wind is considered in relation to shot decision. “The wind is moving left to right and slightly into so I am
going to use. . ..”
Tree A tree obstructing the intended line of next shot or is
taken into consideration of next shot.
“The trees are reachable from this tee”
Rain Any reference to rain “It’s starting to rain but it’s not too bad”
Mistakes Shot error Any reference to a shot error after shot has been
taken. Either physical (swing fault) or mental (club
selection)
“I’ve hit that too hard”, “I’ve fluffed that”
“I should of used a . . . iron”
Performance Result of shot
Happy with the shot
Describing how the shot has finished
Positive statements about the shot just played
“That’s finished up on the fairway”
“that’s exactly how I wanted to hit it”
Negative words Using any kind of negative words or cursing before or
after a shot has been taken
“I am a rubbish golfer”
Short putts Putts from within 5 feet “It was about three foot and I just stroked it in for a par”
Score Score Any reference to score for the hole or round “I needed to putt this for a birdie”
Number of putts Concerns about the number of putts played during
the hole or round.
“I’m going to try and 2 putt par”
Safety Play safe Choosing to play a safer or less cautious shot. “I need to play a safe shot here”
Risk Playing a shot with a more high risk element. “There’s a bit of risk in this shot but if it pays off it will be
worth it”
Pre-performance Practice swing Taking a practice swing before hitting the shot “A couple of practice strokes looking at the hole”
Cleaning the ball Cleaning the ball before the next shot “I will just clean the ball up”
Pre-performance words Words said before shots are played “OK ready”
Targets to aim for
Overall aim of shot
Objects or parts of the course that are used as targets
for shots.
Specifying exactly what is intended in the shot
“I’ve picked the church steeple in the background to
aim for”
“I want this to bend round the tree and then I can chip it
onto the green”
Reflection ‘Last time I played this
shot’
Any reference to what they did previously (last shot or
last week) when playing a similar shot
“Like the last putt, I don’t have to worry about the pace
too much”
‘Last time I played this
hole’
Any reference to what they did previously when
playing the same hole.
“Last time I played this hole, I hit it onto the road”
Feelings/Emotions Anxious When a golfer refers to being nervous or anxious “I’m always a bit anxious on the first shot of the first
hole.
Confidence Stating that the performer is feeling confident about a
shot or hole
“I know I can hit this shot well”
during TA than at interview. One-way repeated measures
ANOVA indicated no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in percentage
similarity across the three time points [F(2,17) = 0.09; p = 0.91,
η2 = 0.01].
Discussion
The purpose of Study 2 was to test the methodology of TA
further by examining the congruence between verbal data
collected on decision making in golf via Level 3 TA reports
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FIGURE 1 | Mean frequency of second-order themes that were cited during Think Aloud (TA; during performance) and interviews; (A) 10 min post
performance (B) 24 h post-performance (C) 48 h post performance.
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TABLE 6 | Number of first-order themes identified during TA of two
separate holes (during performance) and interview at the three time
conditions; 10 min, 24h, and 48 h after performance.
Think Aloud over two
separate holes
Interview
M SD Time of Interview M SD
37.50 8.73 10 min 35.33 16.51
41.00 8.27 24 h 36.00 11.61
51.21 16.31 48 h 37.21 9.45
TABLE 7 | Percentage similarity in themes identified during TA and at
interview.
Percentage of similarity
Comparison M SD
TA vs. 10 min interview 40.66 8.73
TA vs. 24 h interview 37.83 14.83
TA vs. 48 h interview 40.16 12.04
and cued retrospective recall at diﬀerent time intervals after
performance. Results found similarities in the quantity of data
provided, however, the congruence between thoughts verbalized
during TA and interview was low, with only a 38–41% level
of agreement. This suggests participant’s verbalized diﬀerent
thoughts during TA than they did during retrospective interview.
The level of congruence between TA and retrospective interview
remained low whether interviews were conducted 10 min after
performance, 24 or 48 h and did not change as a function of time
of interview as predicted.
When thoughts were recorded using TA golfers talked more
about their score and the pre-performance activity they engaged
in prior to a shot compared to at interview. This included
thoughts about a practice swing, cleaning of the ball, pre-
performance words or identifying a target to aim for. These
verbalizations are important for understanding the decisions
golfers make during a round and were missed when data was
collected at interview.
The results of Study 2 indicate a clear discrepancy in the
verbalizations made by golfers regarding their thoughts and
decisions when verbal data is collected using TA compared to
retrospective interview. This suggests retrospective interviews
that have been previously used (Macquet, 2009; Cotterill et al.,
2010; Mulligan et al., 2012) may be limited for understanding
cognitions involved in decision making in sport.
General Discussion
The ﬁndings from both Study 1 and 2 support the use for TA as
an appropriate method for collecting in event cognitions. Recent
research (Calmeiro and Tenenbaum, 2011) has expressed a need
to determine whether verbalizing during motor performance
(putting) interferes with task outcome. This was examined in
Study 1. In this study the moderating eﬀects of skill level
was also considered. Hence, based on Masters (1992) theory
of reinvestment it was predicted that those in the higher
skilled stages of learning would experience a larger performance
decrement due to the possibility that what would usually be an
automatic task could be disrupted or undone if the performer
tried to control the task with declarative knowledge using TA.
The results of Study 1 demonstrated that contrary to previous
ﬁndings (Klatzky, 1984) and Masters (1992) reinvestment theory,
thinking aloud at Level 3 does not have a negative eﬀect on
motor performance. Hence, it was expected that relatively novice
performers would beneﬁt from thinking aloud at Level 3 due
to the increased attentional monitoring of their step-by-step
performance (Beilock et al., 2002) whereas skilled performers
would show a decrement in performance due to experiencing
a disruption in their automatic processes of the putting skill
(Masters, 1992). The latter prediction was based on the notion
that skilled performance is said to be controlled in an open
loop fashion and use of explicit knowledge would interfere with
performance (e.g., Masters et al., 1993). For novice performers
on the other hand, performance is more likely characterized as
closed loop and feedback driven, requiring attention demanding
processing. Hence, hypothesis testing is an important aspect
of skill acquisition during the early stage of the learning
process (Fitts and Posner, 1967). However, Level 3 TA did not
disrupt performance in either skill level group and did not
lead to reinvestment among skilled performers since there were
very few verbalizations regarding technical instructions. It is
thought that the higher skilled performers may have been using
deliberate planning and gathering information to enhance their
performance.
Study 2 provided further evidence for use of TA as
a methodology within the sport research domain and that
retrospective interviews are potentially limited for understanding
cognitions related to decision making in sport since large
discrepancies were found between thoughts generated during TA
and during retrospective interviews. Only a 38–41% similarity
was found in thoughts verbalized by golfers during TA and
at interview. These ﬁndings could be accounted for through
memory decay at interview. Research by Stone et al. (1998) has
found that 30% of participants failed to retrospectively report
things that they had reported during in event assessments.
Further explanations could be the issue of bias at interview, since
participants might report shots diﬀerently depending on their
perceived success. Bahrick et al. (1996) found issues of bias in
terms of student’s high school grades and those who achieved
higher grades were more accurate in recalling them. This study
also takes a step forward in terms of ecological validity as it
involves using TA in a real life golf setting, where golfers are
performing on a real course using all range of shots, which is a
factor that limits a lot of TA literature (Calmeiro and Tenenbaum,
2011).
The present studies provide the ﬁrst evidence that using the TA
methodology does not negatively inﬂuence motor performance
of a self-paced task and that TA appears to be a more
suitable methodology than retrospective recall when examining
cognitions in the domain of sport.
Previous research using TA (Nicholls and Polman, 2008;
Calmeiro and Tenenbaum, 2011; Germain and Tenenbaum,
2011) have treated TA as a record of the participant’s ongoing
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decision making process, and they believe that the information
verbalized represents a portion of the information currently
being attended to (Ericsson and Simon, 1980). However, it is
important to acknowledge that we cannot be 100% certain that
everything being verbalized is what is actually being thought
at the time. Furthermore, some cognitive processes are not
conscious and an individual cannot access what happens to
the decision making process outside of awareness. Unconscious
processes are not possible to verbalize and the mechanisms that
mediate the process of unconscious processing are still widely
discussed in cognitive psychology (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977;
Dehaene et al., 1998; Elsner et al., 2008). For example, Nisbett
and Wilson (1977) highlighted how an individual’s ability to
provide valid reports of cognitive processes could prove diﬃcult.
Nisbett and Wilson (1977) argue that there are limits to what can
be accessed consciously. Instead participants may give implicit
theories about their thought process. If a performer does not
have direct verbal access to their control process, especially if
they are automatic, it may lead to a performer reporting cues
that they expect or have been told are important. As such, golfers
might report what they think they should do rather what they
actually do. Problems associated with Level 2 TA is that there is
no independent means of assessing their completeness (Wilson,
1994) as under some circumstances because some cognitive
processes are not part of focused attention, or appear in a
form that is not easily verbalizable (Ericsson and Simon, 1993).
Therefore, Level 2 TA verbalisation may not provide enough
detail of the thought processes involved in decision making
during golf performance.
Ball et al. (2015) highlighted the disruptive eﬀect that can
occur through verbally reporting as verbal-overshadowing occurs
as the formation of a verbally biased memory representation that
overshadows original visual memory. It is argued that by asking
participants to explain and describe their thoughts, as is required
in Level 3 verbalization, this may result in reactive eﬀects on task
process that can inﬂuence the performance of a task. However,
Ball et al. (2015) research focused on an insight problem solving
task, whereas golf involves more simplistic reasoning regarding
shot selection. As such the nature of a task should be considered
in future research that examines the inﬂuence of TA on task
performance.
Conclusion
Collective ﬁndings suggest TA does not inﬂuence motor
performance and is a valuable method for recording cognitive
processes of individuals during task performance. Findings
revealed that Level 2 TA is diﬀerent from Level 3 TA with Level
3 providing richer information in both the quantity and quality
of the information. However, this appears to be moderated by
the skill level of participants. Furthermore, TA provides richer
verbal data regarding decisions than cued retrospective recall.
Future research should use TA from a theoretical perspective
to examine in-event cognition in self-paced sporting tasks such
as golf. Future studies might examine skill level diﬀerences in
cognition for golfers playing a full round of golf on a real course,
and examine the inﬂuence of competitive stress on cognition.
This would advance understanding of in event cognition in sport,
since much of the research examining cognitive processes in
sport is conducted in contrived laboratory environments or using
retrospective methods.
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